Abstract: This paper sets out the potential impacts of GURTs on various developing countries. The impact on any country depends on a number of important factors: existing biotechnology capability, capacity for developing biotechnology, and the country's suitability for planting non-hybridized modern varieties. For a large group of developing countries the potential impact from GURTs will be dependent on the impact of these technologies on the rate of diffusion of innovation from countries that possess biotechnological capabilities to those countries that do not. This is necessarily an empirical question, because there are two important effects that are countervailing: the impact of GURTs on the general rate of innovation and the impact of GURTs on the rate of diffusion between countries. To address this question, a case study is constructed assessing the impact of hybridized varieties on the diffusion of innovation within maize production. This case study indicates that hybridization as a URT has slowed the overall rate of diffusion of innovation to many developing countries. When GURTs are introduced it will be important to increase public spending for diffusion of innovations to continue.
Introduction
Genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) [1] represent a new technological advance in aid of the appropriation of the benefits generated by reason of plant breeding investments. Investments in R&D are always problematic, since the values of innovation are notoriously difficult to appropriate. In the case of plant breeding this problem is multiplied by the fact that the resulting product has inbuilt reproduction capabilities. This renders the need for future purchases unnecessary, and it makes it quick and inexpensive to become an instant competitor with the innovator in the use and supply of the innovation. Partly by reason of these characteristics of rapid diffusion, the agricultural R&D sector is currently a very diffuse and diverse enterprise, consisting of farmers, public sector enterprises, private multinationals and international organizations. GURTs have been devised to address the problem of appropriability, but they will also have substantial impacts on this overall R&D structure. The objective of this paper is to attempt to disentangle some of these various impacts of GURTS, and especially to differentiate the likely effects on various developing countries.
The paper proceeds by initially setting forth a discussion of the various factors that will determine the impacts of GURTs on various countries. These factors are then used to classify nearly 100 different developing countries by reference to the anticipated impact of the new technology. This exercise only points to the importance of a further study, as it is found that nearly half of the developing countries will have their benefits determined by the rate of diffusion that exists under the new technology. This leads to an examination of another system directed to the same purpose -the maize case study attached as Appendix A. The interrelationship between the appropriation system and the level of public spending is considered. Then we conclude with the consideration of policy implications for the advent of GURTs.
Discussion: determining the factors that will determine the impacts of GURTs
The object of genetic use restriction technologies (GURTs) is to enhance the appropriability of the benefits from innovations in seed development. This object may be achieved in part through biotechnologies that engender future generation seed sterilityrendering it necessary for farmers to repurchase seeds from the company at each planting season. This enhances appropriability because it means that farmers purchasing the seed once will not be able to compete with the seed company in the future supply of seed with those characteristics (for purposes of sale or own use) [2] . In the first instance there is no reason to believe that enhanced appropriability is harmful to the interests of farmers. This is because the direct effect of this technique will correspond only to the appropriation of the increased value of the innovations contained within the GURT seed. Farmers will continue to have the ability to purchase normally reproducing seed, only it will be without the innovations contained within the GURT seed. The availability of this seed will constrain the price at which GURT seed can be marketed, and it will mean that it will only be the added value of the innovation it contains that will cause it to be valued more highly. Therefore, at first sight, there is no reason to believe that farmers could be made worse off through the introduction of these technologies. These technologies merely add an option that did not exist previously.
However there are significant indirect effects that may also result from the introduction of these technologies. For example, in the future, farmers refusing to purchase GURTs may be denied not only the single restricted use innovation (attached to a general use plant variety), they may also be denied the use of an entire series of past innovations that have never diffused into general agriculture. It is this potential impact on the diffusion of agricultural innovations that is the most problematic characteristic of this new technology. In order to see this it is important to contrast how agricultural innovation diffused in the past, with how it is likely to diffuse in the future.
In the past, innovations in plant varieties have diffused into general use within agriculture over time even if released as protected varieties, because of the capacity to undertake breeding activities making use of them [3] . Sometimes this breeding activity was undertaken by private individuals but many times it occurred within public institutions. In fact publicly funded institutions (both at the national and international levels) have placed substantial funding and efforts into ensuring that recent innovations are diffused across the developing countries [4] . These public agricultural research institutions have done this by taking observed innovative characteristics and breeding them into locally used varieties.
Hence, a big difference between GURTs and the previous appropriation systems is that GURTs capture the value of the innovative characteristics by maintaining control over the plant variety in which they are embedded. These distinctions between the 'innovative characteristics' and the 'plant variety templates' (on which they are embedded) are categorized as the 'software' and the 'hardware' components of modern plant breeding activities. To a significant extent in the past, even when the software has been developed by private breeders, it has been possible for much of it to diffuse quickly and inexpensively across the developing world by means of its incorporation within different hardware.
The movement toward GURTs may restrict the diffusion of recent innovations across developing countries. In effect the software would become hardware-specific, and it would be entirely up to the discretion and motivation of the innovator to diffuse its innovation to all of the various parts of the world on which it would confer benefits. In other words, the most significant (albeit indirect) impact of this change in technology would be the potential elimination of a currently diverse R&D sector (farmers, public sector, private sector), and its replacement with a fairly homogeneous and highly concentrated private sector. It is possible then that the rate and extent of diffusion of future innovations in agriculture would occur only under the exclusive control and direction of the originator of the initial innovation. This is problematic for two reasons [5] . First, with sufficient time and a significant number of innovations, the other currently existing suppliers of plant varieties (private and public) might be rendered commercially obsolete. This would be the case if the alternative suppliers could only acquire the characteristics at high prices, and thus were only able to supply inferior substitute varieties. Then the farmer might face a small number of suppliers of viable seed, and consequentially much increased prices for GURT seed varieties [6] .
Secondly, and if this were the case, then the private sector might be able effectively to eliminate the public sector from all breeding activities on account of the need for licences and the restrictiveness of material exchanges. This might have deleterious consequences for those countries that are most highly dependent on public investment for their plant breeding needs.
Another perspective on this part of the problem is to note that the commercial sector may not have sufficient private incentives to diffuse its software widely, i.e. across a diverse enough array of plant varieties [7] . Then the innovations would be targeted only at those markets where there was adequate demand, while general diffusion would be disallowed in order to protect those markets. The farmers on the fringes would be faced with farming with the innovative characteristics embedded in poorly performing varieties, or farming with the best local varieties but without the innovative characteristics.
Therefore the move to GURTs as an appropriation system is important primarily for the indirect effects that it might have on the entire system of R&D currently existing within agriculture. And these indirect effects are important because they might make a tremendous difference in the rate of diffusion of innovations to particular developing countries. In the next sections we first attempt to segregate the various categories of countries, and then we attempt to assess the extent to which the rate and direction of innovation will be slowed in those countries that are most affected.
Categories of countries
The above discussion indicates that there are a few key factors that will determine the impact of these new technologies on the various developing countries. The first factor is the capability of the developing country to undertake its own biotechnology. If it is able to do this, then there is little change in the rate of technological diffusion with the introduction of GURTs, as these countries will be able to 'reverse engineer' GURT varieties as easily as they could any other variety [8] . For these countries (the biotechnology-capable) the impacts of GURTs are primarily positive. So, the first important question for ascertaining the impact of this new technology is: Does the subject country possess actual or incipient biotechnological capabilities?
For countries without biotechnological capabilities, the important question concerns the impacts of GURTs on the rate of diffusion of innovations within their agriculture. In order to address this issue, we turn to an analogue from the agricultural industry. Approximately 50 years ago the agricultural industry experienced its first technological revolution with the introduction of modern hybridized varieties (into sexually reproducing crops such as maize). To a large extent the advent of GURTs simply extends the effects of these forms of technologies to asexually reproducing crops (such as wheat and rice). The second important factor for ascertaining the impact of GURTs is: Does the subject country have a significant investment in crops that are amenable to GURTs (such as wheat and rice)?
The third important question will concern the extent to which the biotech-capable countries will include another country within their research strategies. How quickly will the benefits from the technology diffuse to the non-bt country? Again, the experience with the hybridized modern varieties is instructive. We are able to examine how quickly and how extensively an individual country has benefited from innovations that have occurred at the technological frontier, by examining how innovations within the hybrid variety sector have diffused.
In the remainder of this paper we attempt to assess qualitatively the impacts of GURTs on various developing countries by reference to these specific factors. The first questions are addressed by reference to various indicators of technological capability. The last question is addressed in a case study on the impacts of hybrid variety based technologies.
Impact groups and GURTs
There are three basic dimensions along which the economic impacts at the country level will be assessed. We will assume that GURTs will have the effect of increasing appropriability of the value (or rents) from plant breeding activities, given that the country has biotechnological (BT) capability. We will further assume that GURTs will have positive impacts on the productivity of agriculture in those countries with a) BT capability and b) significant land area dedicated to GURT crop varieties. Finally, we will assume that when a country is not BT capable, then the key to the impacts of GURT technologies will be the rate and extent of the diffusion of innovation to that country, i.e. to what extent do the needs of the given country factor into the plans and objectives of the bt-based plant breeding sector?
These assumptions lead to the categorization of the developing countries into five distinct groups. Table 1 gives a summary of the classifications. Group A comprises those countries with existent BT capabilities. These are the developing countries that will produce GURT-based crops themselves.
Group B includes those with an incipient biotech sector. This may be the result of either a) an already existent but immature sector or b) a good prospect for the development of GURT capacity through foreign investment and ease of regulation. In other words, these are the countries with good potential to catch up to group A.
In Group C we classify countries likely to convert their agriculture to GURT-based systems and thus reap the productivity benefits from that technology although they will be unable to develop domestic GURT capacity for the time being. They are countries with a built-in tendency toward GURT crops, and a moderately high rate of diffusion of innovations from other countries' plant breeding sectors.
Group D features those countries that are currently highly dependent on public R&D spending and may lack the liquidity to adopt risky new technology. This means that these countries are in danger of suffering disadvantages from GURTs, particularly by virtue of a slow-down in the rate of agricultural productivity growth. They are 'slow diffusion' countries, in that innovations from other countries' plant breeding sectors do not necessarily confer productivity benefits in these countries.
Group E consists of those countries with a small amount of land in crops likely to be targeted by GURTs. Although these countries are not likely to benefit from this biotechnology in any way, they are also not likely to find themselves in a worse position than before. These are countries that will face a small loss in R&D rents, but whose level of productivity growth -already low -will be unaffected by GURTs. In this section we select certain criteria to proxy for the above indicators. These are listed below in Table 2 . We use the measured stage of development of the biotechnology sector (as indicated within a five-year-old study on biotechnology) as the proxy for existence of bt capacity. Most of these countries should be listed in the first rank of the biotechnologically capable, by reason of their head start in the area. The other proxy we use for this variable is the share of the world's transgenic crops.
To measure the capability for biotechnological development, we use an index measuring the ease of foreign investment and another measuring the stringency of regulation. It is assumed that the transfer of high technology, such as BT, will require substantial foreign investments and a relatively light touch in regulation.
To measure the extent to which BT innovations diffuse to the subject country, we use a measure derived from the case of maize hybrid varieties. This measure indicates the extent to which the given country is operating at the technological frontier in maize production. To the extent to which it falls far from the technological frontier, this must be to some extent attributable to the failure of innovations to be tailored or diffused to the subject country's characteristics.
To measure the potential non-impact of GURTs, we use a measure of the extent to which arable land is currently invested in crops that are likely to be early subjects of GURTs. To the extent to which a country is not invested in such crops, it is likely that the change in technology will have little if any impact on that country. Table 2 Criterion for classification of developing countries
Criterion Explanation
Indicator 1:
Biotech capacity
Or

Stage of Development
This criterion captures the current stage of the biotechnological capability of a developing country. 'Capable' means that a country is currently able to produce genetically modified organisms. The other terms refer to the stage of development of biotech capacity. 'Advanced' means that it is within 5 years of being able to do so, 'nascent' means that a country is likely to become capable within 10 years. 'Preparatory' means that a country has taken first steps and provided public funding for the establishment of biotech capability. The countries named have been identified in a ISNAR survey report [9] .
Share of world area of transgenic crops
These data show how much of the world's transgenic crop are grown in a particular country. In this, they indicate a country's agro-technological stage and experience with GM crops. The data have been compiled by ISAAA in 1998 [10].
Indicator 2:
FDI-
Ease of Investment
This criterion reports a country's ranking in terms of openness to foreign direct investment (FDI). In this, it is a measure of a country's probability to benefit from the transfer of biotechnological knowledge from developed countries by direct investment in human and physical capital. Countries are ranked from 1 (very open) to 5 (closed to FDI) . The ranking was conducted by the Heritage Foundation in 1998.
[11]
REG-
Regulatory Environment
This criterion measures a country's ranking in terms of costliness and impediments to economic freedom by virtue of governmental regulation. In this it is a measure of how rapidly a country can benefit from technological progress through implementation. Countries are ranked from 1 (low level of regulation) to 5 (very high level of regulation). The ranking was conducted by the Heritage Foundation in 1998 [11] .
Indicator 3: Yield Gap
These data show the gap between the country's yield in maize and the average maize yield for developed countries as a percentage of the developed country mean. This is a rough indicator of a country's current ability to capture productivity rents from a crop for which the most productive varieties are technologically protected. Countries with a high gap have problems at present in capitalizing fully on the best technology available. These data are compiled on the basis of the most recent FAO database entries for 1998/9.
Indicator 4: GURT potential
These data show what share of a country's arable land not planted in crops with hybrid potential is planted in crops likely to be targeted by GURTs (wheat, rice, cotton, soybean, barley). This indicates the potential for introducing GURTs into this country under the present conditions. Countries that have either exhausted their arable land in the cultivation of crops that are available as hybrids or grow an exotic portfolio of crops achieve a low score in this category. These data are compiled on the basis of the most recent FAO database entries for 1998/9. Table 3 classifies 98 developing countries in accordance with the indicators and criteria set forth above. Group A is the class of countries for which GURTs are likely to have an immediate and positive impact. Group B is the class of countries for which GURTs are likely to have a positive impact in the near term (once biotechnological capacities are advanced). Group C is the class of countries for which GURTs are likely to have an uncertain impact due to countervailing effects. They are unlikely to benefit from their own biotechnological capacities, but they have indicated that they do benefit from relatively rapid and extensive diffusion of innovations from other countries. Group D is the class of countries for which GURTs are likely to have an uncertain impact, highly dependent on the extent to which innovations diffuse from the capable to the non-capable countries. Group E is the class of countries for which GURTs are likely to have little impact, positive or negative [12] . 
Classification of developing countries
Group D (Uncertain Impact-Slow Diffusion)
Afghanistan n/a n/a n/a 0
Bhutan n/a n/a n/a 0 45% -88% 7 The diffusion problem Table 3 classifies 40 out of the 98 developing countries in the study as belonging to group D. This makes it by far the most prominent group among the five different classes. For reasons explained below, this is also the group for which it is the most difficult to assess the net impact of GURTs. Group D consists of countries that are not likely to command biotechnologies and their commercial application for the foreseeable future. This means that they will certainly be adversely affected by the shift in the share of R&D rents from farmers and consumers to plant breeders. With no significant R&D contributions that could be protected with the use of GURTs, the R&D balance will move against these countries. On the other hand, with reasonable shares of land under potential GURT crops, improvements in the rate of agricultural productivity growth are possible.
The problem for the countries in group D lies in their current yield gap in maize. This is the third defining criterion of countries in group D. It identifies countries that lag far behind the yield development in another crop already protected by technological means, maize, and are therefore likely to face similar problems when technological protection becomes available for other crops.
This unsatisfactory track record in catching up to productivity developments in maize shifts the focus to the problem of the diffusion of crop improvement across countries. Many countries in group D rely heavily on the trickle-down process of productivity gains that is mediated through public plant breeding institutions and local farmer breeding [13] . The important issue becomes the extent to which the maize experience is generalizable to GURTs. To answer these questions it is necessary to turn to a case study on the impact of the introduction of hybridization technologies on the character of the R&D sector pertaining to maize. (see Maize Case Study attached as Annex A)
Results from the maize case study
The key results from the maize case study are indicative of severe difficulties for the countries classified in Group D. These results are as follows:
1 the new appropriation technology stimulates private R&D investment (Figures 1-3) ; 2 the new technology 'crowds out' public sector plant breeding in the area (Figures 4-6) ;
3 the combination of increased private R&D investment and reduced public sector investment results in a widening productivity gap between the developed and the developing countries (Table A1 ).
In short, the availability of hybrid varieties in maize increased private plant breeding activities but reduced involvement in maize plant breeding by the public sector. This outcome indicates that the integration of the 'software' and 'hardware' of plant breeding makes the private sector more profitable, while rendering the public sector infeasible. The public sector no longer offers a generally competitive alternative to the private sector's plant varieties, and so it leaves the field to the private sector ( Figure 6 ) The outcome is a widening gap between those countries whose plant breeding is on the technological frontier and those whose breeding lags behind. Clearly the private sector is not placing the same amount of efforts into diffusing its innovations throughout the developing countries, as is the private/public mixed R&D sector for those crops unable to be hybridized. Just as clearly the public sector is not able to continue to function in these markets, probably by reason of the restricted flow of materials and characteristics. The replacement of the mixed system of R&D with the private sector version has resulted in systematic widening of productivity gaps between rich and poor countries.
The public sector context -public sector spending and technological change
The critical factor for the countries in group D is the rate of diffusion that will exist under GURTs. The Maize Case Study indicates that there is good reason to be concerned that the rate of diffusion will slow with GURTs, as the flow of plant materials and the level of public funding is restricted. It may be possible to avoid the experience in the maize sector with the advent of GURTs. The advance of the private hybrid sector has taken place against the background of a policy of declining emphasis on public sector agricultural R&D. The growth in spending on agricultural R&D has been slowing down in developed countries, thus giving rise to a slowing down in the rate of diffusion. Global agricultural R&D spending disaggregated by developed and developing countries is presented in the Table below: Table 4 Real agricultural R&D spending in developed and developing countries The combination of increasingly complex technologies, increasingly restricted (and costly) material exchange and declining growth in public R&D investments renders it impossible for public sector plant breeders to maintain the breadth of objectives that existed previously. It is a combination of three factors -a) technological advance; b) material exchange restrictions; and c) public investment levels -that will determine the overall impact on developing countries dependent on diffusion.
The impact of GURTs -policy choices
Since the impact of these appropriation technologies is likely to be dependent on other public policies, it is important to consider the interaction between these policies and technologies. It is possible that the impacts of GURTs might differ significantly from those of the hybrids, if the public sector combines them with different funding and management policies. Table 5 displays the rates of R&D diffusion for three different technology management systems and under two different assumptions concerning the level of public spending. For example, the Table indicates that the rate of diffusion of innovations in hybrid varieties is slow with low levels of public funding (as the maize case study indicates) but is likely to be increased significantly if public sector funding were to be increased. On the other hand, the diffusion of innovations for non-hybrid varieties is currently much more rapid and extensive than it is for hybrid varieties (but also dependent on public sector expenditures). Hence Table 5 indicates that agricultural R&D currently registers very different impacts on developing countries, depending on whether the variety is a hybrid one or not [15] .
The critical issue for the impact of GURTs is whether (given the combination of management and spending policies applied) they will more closely follow the current example of the hybrid or the non-hybrid sector. Table 6 explains the two different forms of appropriation thought possible for GURTs, in contrast to the current system of IPR protection that forms the baseline scenario.
Table 6
Baseline and scenarios for appropriation systems
System Description
Current IPR Based System (baseline)
This is the current system -where the release of GURTs is delayed indefinitely. It features one sector where legal protection through IPRs must be sought to protect R&D investment while it offers technological protection for a small set of outbreeding crops through hybridization. Under the current system, IPR remains the sole source of protection for R&D inputs into crop improvement into wheat, rice, cotton and other staple crops.
Table 6
Baseline and scenarios for appropriation systems (continued)
System Description
Combined Use of GURTs and IPRs
This scenario regarding the legal implementation of GURTs can be considered as probable, as it does not require any changes in the existing legal structure.
The situation would closely resemble the one that presents itself currently with combined legal protection in the form of Plant Variety Protection (PVP) and technological protection through the use of hybrid cultivars.
The introduction of GURTs would extend the feasibility of these combined regimes (beyond outbreeding crops). It is likely to have the effect of restricting the vast majority of agricultural R&D to the private sector, and to slow the diffusion of innovation to developing countries in Group D.
GURTs Only-
Public Sector Policies Directed to Diffusion
It is possible for a combination of public sector policies to render the advent of GURTs a win-win situation. This would be the case if public policies were directed to the purpose of speeding the diffusion of private sector innovations (protected only by GURTs) throughout general agriculture.
This would occur by means of enhanced public investment in R&D for the express purpose of reverse engineering the GURT-protected characteristics, with the object of translocating them into local varieties for developing countries.
GURT-based protection probably would be adequate to maintain appropriability of a new plant variety for about three years, and so it would afford some protection to the innovators. The removal of other (IPR-based) constraints on diffusion would aid the rapid extension of these innovations to developing countries.
Conclusion
GURTs are positioned to become an additional technological solution to the problem of rent appropriation. They represent the capacity to extend the solution concept of hybridization to those crop varieties that are not outbreeding. This suggests that the rates of diffusion for hybrids (in Table 5 ) will be extended to those crops that are currently protected only through IPRs. This implies a significant decline in the rate of diffusion of innovations across agriculture. In turn this suggests a problem for those developing countries identified previously as dependent on the public sector for the diffusion of agricultural innovations. The only real alternative is to meet this technological advance with public policies addressed to its deficiencies. These will be public policies that are directed to the purpose of aiding the diffusion of these innovations from the private sector to the public sector, and then on to those developing countries with little biotechnological capability. In short the public sector must manage these deficiencies in diffusion with funding directed to the reverse engineering of GURT-protected innovations, and the diffusion of these characteristics into general agriculture. It must also make clear that GURTs will function well as an alternative to IPR based protection systems, and not as a complement to them.
1 GURTs may come as either variety based, or trait based. Since the described technologies are predominantly variety based, this paper will focus only on these. The authors do not believe that the problems indicated herein would apply to trait-based GURTs. 2 An alternative method for achieving this same object is the adoption of laws restricting such resale or reuse of commercially acquired seed. This method has been implemented in those countries that have adopted so-called plant breeders rights (PBRs) and/or seed patents, and enforced them strictly against their citizens. To a large extent GURTs should be seen as a technologically supplied alternative to these systems, with the important difference that individual countries do not have the option under GURTs to elect adoption of the system or determine the degree of enforcement. In this paper we examine the impact of switching from such IPR based R&D systems to GURT-based systems. 3 There are several important distinctions between PBR systems and GURT-based systems.
First, PBR systems are limited in duration, while GURTs are not. Second, PBR systems often contain an 'own use' exemption for farmers, which enable their own breeding activities. Thirdly, and most importantly, PBR systems merely disallow the marketing of the same plant variety in competition with its innovator; they do not disallow breeding activities making use of the new plant variety (e.g. to translocate its innovative characteristics to other plant varieties). 4 The domestic system used for accomplishing this purpose is known as the National Agricultural Research Centres (NARCs) while the international system devised in part to achieve the same purpose is known as the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CG system). 5 Again, it is important to emphasize that there is nothing problematic in the first instance about the appropriation of the returns from innovation -this will simply enhance the prospects for effective investments in plant breeding activities. The problems that must be considered are second order ones, viz. the impact of wholly vesting agricultural R&D within the private sector and within a concentrated industry. 6 This would be the result of the refusal to licence innovations at reasonable prices to potential competitors, and the maintenance of very low prices until they were removed from the market. It is essentially the sort of conduct with which Microsoft has been charged. 7 For example, one well-known problem in the economics of market failure is the difficulty imposed by minimum efficient scales of operation. This can result in the targeting of only the median consumer, or in this case the typical agricultural producer, and the failure to address the diversity of needs within a diverse consumer base. 8 The GURT form of system has little effect on biotechnology capable countries, precisely because they will be able to use biotechnology to unravel and relocate the innovative characteristic. In this case the GURT merely provides a short term advantage to the innovative breeder, possibly a head start of only two or three years in the marketing of the characteristic. The problem lies more in those countries with both little of their own biotechnological capacity, and little investment by others interested in diffusing innovative characteristics into their local varieties. Jones and Co. 12 It should be noted that the groupings used here are intended only for illustrative purposes.
Clearly there may be better proxies and measures of the indicators we have discussed, and these would provide for different groupings of the developing countries. The sole purpose of Table 3 is to indicate, firstly, that the impacts of GURTs will be non-uniform and highly variable and, secondly, that the variability of the impacts will nevertheless be systematic and reasonably predictable.
changes GURTs will bring about with regard to the level of R&D in crop improvement, its impacts on agricultural productivity and the patterns of land use in other crops.
The following study will review some characteristics of changes that occurred in the agricultural use of maize as a result of the introduction of hybridization. Maize has been among the most successful of modern cultivars both in terms of scale of adoption and growth of yield potential over time. Figure 1 shows the increase in R&D spending on maize improvement in the US between 1960 and 1989 in constant dollars. Total spending increased in real terms from about 44 million US dollars in 1960 to roughly 208 million, a quadrupling of R&D expenditures. The increase in private spending is particularly dramatic, rising more than tenfold from around 11 million to circa 146 million US dollars over the same period. Several studies suggest that this increase is directly related to the availability of technological protection of R&D investment [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] . Technological protection is a better stimulant for private R&D spending than PVP.
Technological protection stimulates private R&D spending
It is instructive to compare this development in maize with the development in other crops for which no technological protection of R&D investment has so far been available. Although the increases in total R&D spending over the 30 year period are of roughly the same magnitude as in the case of corn, the expenditures are in both cases predominantly borne by public R&D bodies. As is visible from the private expenditure data, the private sector responded to the availability of legal plant variety protection (PVP) from the early 1970s onwards, but not nearly to the same extent as in the case of corn where hybridization offered technological protection. This finding is confirmed by a number of studies on the impact of PVP on the plant breeding industry [22, 23] . This is not to say that PVP has been without effect. Indeed, the plant breeding industry responded vigorously to the introduction of PVP legislation in the USA in the 1960s [24] . However, R&D spending has concentrated on a small number of crops, especially wheat and soybean, rather than benefiting crop improvement across a wide range of crops [18] .
Private R&D spending leads to crowding out of public spending
There is another important component to the history of R&D spending between maize and non-hybrid varieties. Comparing the development of public and private spending in maize in Figure 4 , it is apparent that private spending increased relative to public spending over the 30 year time period such as to become the main component of total spending by 1984. Even more remarkable -when compared to Figures 5 and 6 -is that public spending -after peaking around 1979 -went into a decline in absolute numbers while public spending increased vigorously in other R&D areas, albeit at a reduced pace. The conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that technological protection not only stimulates private spending, but that it drives out public spending as a result as well. This conforms to a general pattern of private R&D activity crowding out public spending on crop improvement that can also be observed in the other areas (e.g. for soybeans, cf. [20] .
In other crops only protected through legal measures such as wheat, private R&D has remained flat while public spending on crop improvement has soared over the same time period. The specific trend of private spending crowding out public spending is therefore very peculiar to hybrid crops [25] . Source: Based on data in Fuglie et al. [21] T . Swanson and T. Goschl Source: Based on data in Fuglie et al. [21] Technological protection reduces diffusion of productivity gains to developing countries Spending on agricultural R&D has generally benefited a wide range of farmers by a process of technological diffusion that leads -over time -to productivity gains even for resource-poor farmers. This means that although poor farms would lag behind current productivity trends, some gains would trickle down eventually through public and farmer crop improvement. This diffusion is generally independent of the source of the initial crop improvement, whether public or private.
The crops receiving the highest amount of total R&D expenditures in the USA arein this order -corn, soybeans, wheat, cotton, sorghum and rice. Per value of production, maize and sorghum are the crops that have received the highest amounts of private R&D in the USA [21] . This confirms our previous finding in that these two crops are the main hybrid crops on the market. How have these investment diffused across the globe? Table A1 Average difference between crop yields of developing countries and developed countries in 1999 [26] Crop Table A1 reports the differences in crop yield between the average of developing and developed countries for major crops. This information provides some very rough estimates of the amount of the diffusion of productivity gains in different crops. What is striking is that diffusion of productivity gains for the two major hybrid crops currently grown has been the weakest. By contrast, the average yield difference is markedly lower for most of the other crops currently only protected by IPRs and for which the public is the main R&D investor. One possible explanation is that higher volumes of investment merely increase the productivity gap measured by a cross-section by increasing the lag of diffusion. The counter argument to this is that in that case we would expect the differences in average yield to follow closely the volume of investment. This is clearly not the case. A more convincing conclusion from the evidence in Table 1 is that there exists a trickle-down effect of crop improvement in the case of non-hybrids that does not exist for crops with technological R&D protection. A transformation of the agricultural system along the lines of hybrid agriculture would therefore be likely to interrupt this diffusion of productivity gains. The importance of spillovers in R&D has been widely discussed in the literature (White and Havlicek on spillovers between regions in the USA, Evenson on those between US states, and most recently Thirtle et al. on spillover between the USA and EU), but the assessment of diffusion to developing countries and of diffusion effects in different crops remains patchy [27] [28] [29] .
Technological protection shifts R&D rents towards plant breeders
One of the overarching motives behind the development of technological R&D protection through hybrids has been to enable plant breeders to appropriate a greater share of the rents from crop improvement. The expectation of higher R&D rents has also served as the main reason behind the dramatic increase in private R&D spending for the crops so protected. Evidence suggests that hybrids have fulfilled this expectation [18, 21] . Figure 4 shows the share of R&D rents captured by private plant breeders and share of revenues re-invested in R&D for different crops. Again, corn and sorghum, the most important hybrid crops, are clearly distinct from the remaining crops in that rent appropriation is well above 30% for both and well ahead of crops protected by IPRs such as wheat or soybeans. It also reports further evidence on the stimulation of private R&D spending in that at least three times the share of rents is reinvested in research compared to other crops. The converse of Figure 4 is of course that other parties have lost in terms of the share of rents captured by virtue of technological protection being available to plant breeders. This shift in the share of rents can therefore be regarded as a general feature of technological protection.
Public breeding fails to offer competitive alternatives to private hybrids
One reason behind the productivity gaps in hybrids is the apparent failure of public breeding to offer attractive alternatives to hybrid-based agriculture. There are several pieces of evidence for this withdrawal of public breeding and its failure to contribute to development. Figure 5 reports the sales of seed of modern cultivars in Latin America. These can be classified into two groups: hybrids, the preferred choice of the private plant breeders, and open-pollinated varieties (OPVs) that are predominantly provided by public breeders.
From Figure 5 , it is apparent that when farmers choose to purchase seed, they are turning towards hybrid varieties. This indicates that the choice of technology adopted by the public sector in favour of OPVs does not seem to reflect farmer preferences. This evidence is corroborated by data on the share of public seed in total seed purchases in Latin America presented in Figure 6 . This shows that sales of public seed have remained at a low level over the course of the eight years surveyed. In combination with Figure 5 , this also means that OPVs of private companies have sold better than those provided by the public breeders over that period of time. This suggests that public breeding even within OPVs is not well aligned with farmer demand relative to the private sector. , 1990 -1997 Source: CIMMYT (1999) Further insight is gained from looking at the share of public relative to private sales. The period from 1990 to 1997 saw a dramatic increase in the demand for seed, doubling from about 150000 tons in 1990 to 300000 in 1997. This suggests a move towards intensive agriculture using improved seed at an impressive rate. How has public breeding contributed to this? Over this period of time, the share of public seed as a proportion of sales almost halved. This means that the development in maize agriculture in Latin America was based entirely on private breeding results. This means that where technological protection becomes available, private plant breeding appears to be more adept at providing crop improvement with desired characteristics. This observation is corroborated by evidence from plant breeding in soybeans where the output from private breeding programs has proven more successful with farmers than that from the public sector [20, 30, 31] . Private breeding sector overtakes the public sector as the provider of key genetic material Most modern hybrid cultivars are derived in one way or another from germplasm material originating in the public sector. In the case of maize, all of the public varieties and most commercial hybrids have parentage from a CGIAR centre, CIMMYT. Table 2 gives information about the use of CIMMYT germplasm in Latin America in 1996. It demonstrates the prevalence of CIMMYT material in areas planted to modern varieties. Somewhat exceptional is the region with the largest maize area and the highest share of area in improved varieties. The Southern Cone is not only the most productive of maize cultivating areas in Latin America, it also relies the least on public material for that purpose. Source: CIMMYT (1999) There are grounds for believing that the case of the Southern Cone is more than accidental. There is growing evidence in the breeding sector that key material for crop improvement is increasingly held by private breeders. This means not only that the private sector is more likely to produce the most productive cultivars than the public sector. It also indicates that under technological protection, the public sector become more reliant on privately-held germplasm at the same time as it becomes increasingly difficult for the public breeding sector to access this material.
[23] This is confirmed by a recent survey of public plant breeders. Forty-eight percent of public breeders surveyed indicated that they had experienced difficulty in obtaining genetic stocks from private companies; 45% indicated that this had interfered with their research; 28% felt that it had interfered with their ability to release new varieties, and 23% reported that it had interfered with the training of graduate students [32] . The picture that emerges from the hybrid sector therefore suggests that in a system of agricultural technology where crop improvement can be protected by technological means, the public sector encounters not only difficulty in providing attractive forms of crop improvement, it also faces the danger of losing the capacity of being able to do so.
Hybrid agriculture crowds out landraces
The agricultural system under GURTs will not only emulate the R&D structure of hybrid crops across agriculture, its pattern of land use will also resemble that brought about by hybrid agriculture. Table A3 reports the relative shares of landraces, improved open-pollinated varieties and hybrids and relative productivity of different regions in Latin America in 1996. Although we have no data on the development over time of these area shares available, it is tempting to look at this Table as showing regions at different stages of agricultural development. This is can be inferred from the mean productivity gap relative to the average yield in developed countries. The Southern Cone is by far the most advanced of these regions in terms of productivity. As expected the productivity gap is inversely related to the area share of improved varieties.
On this basis, the expectation is warranted that the spread of improved varieties exerts pressure on the conversion of non-intensively used land into intensive use with hybrid varieties that are genetically fairly uniform with their population. An emulation of the change brought about by hybrid agriculture across agriculture is therefore likely to bring about a general loss of agricultural biodiversity. This general tendency has also been noted by other observers (e.g. [15] ) and is cause for concern (e.g. [33] ). 
Technological protection increases the productivity gap within countries
Productivity gaps not only exist between countries, they also prevail within countries and are an important source of disparities in income distribution. Table 3 reports the degree of adoption of modern cultivars in different Latin American countries. Comparing the mean productivity gap in Table 3 with the share of improved hybrids, this suggests that there is a correlation between these two measures. This should be obvious given that hybrids are generally used only in the most productive agricultural systems. In combination with Table 1 , however, a second observation can be made: The productivity gap is an average over the whole agricultural sector and combines measurement of both the advanced and the resource-poor sectors of agriculture. The fact that one observes the highest average productivity gaps for hybrids (see point IV) means that the 'internal' productivity gap within countries must also be significant and positively related to the 'external' gap. This means that technological protection can be suspected of having adverse distributional effects.
